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Section 1 Introduction 
 
When we are confronted with decisions of moral significance, the ideal course 
of action, at least according to most moral philosophers, is to look to the moral theory 
to which we subscribe for guidance, and act in accordance with that guidance as best 
we can. This process functions well for those who are quite certain that their preferred 
moral theory is correct, or at least believe that it is sufficient to guide their actions 
without doubt. There are, however, those of us who are genuinely uncertain as to 
which moral theory is correct and most accurately tracks morality. Different moral 
theories make different judgments about the value of each action, the value of each 
outcome, whether a certain act is permissible or impermissible, or whether a certain 
act is merely permissible or supererogatory. Depending on which moral theory we 
subscribe to, the actions we are morally obliged to take may differ substantially, 
putting agents who are genuinely uncertain as to which moral theory is correct in a 
difficult situation whenever they are called to make a decision about which the moral 
theories to which they lend at least some credence disagree. Call this type of 
uncertainty normative uncertainty. 
 
In these situations, agents must either choose some moral theory upon which 
to base their actions, or find some way of hedging their bets, even while being 
uncertain as to which moral theory is true. To do the latter is to distinguish between 
what, objectively, would be morally best for an agent to do, and what would be best 
for them to do subjectively, given their uncertainty about which moral theory is 
correct. There is an important sense in which agents attempting to do what they 
subjectively believe to be morally best are not morally blameworthy if it turns out that 
what they decided to do was not, in fact, morally best. To take an analogy from 
another situation in which an agent might need to make some non-moral decision 
under conditions of uncertainty: we would not condemn an agent, who had not been 
epistemically irresponsible, as irrational for having subjectively chosen some option 
that was, in fact, less valuable than another if they had a genuinely well founded 
belief that the option that they chose was in their best interests. This is because there 
is no rational fault in their decision-making process. They followed the dicta of 
whichever decision theory to which they subscribed as best they could, and it just so 
happened that the world was not such that it turned out best for them. Similarly, 
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agents who are normatively uncertain are not convinced to the exclusion of all other 
moral theories of the correctness of just one theory. It seems fair for them to ask 
“what ought I do when I don’t know what’s right?” 
 
A normatively uncertain agent may desire a decision theory that accounts for 
their position for two reasons. First, where the moral theories in which they place 
credence give differing advice, they might legitimately desire guidance that 
appropriately accounts for the relative weight of the possible actions and outcomes of 
their decision according to each of those moral theories, as well as their degree of 
credence in them. To agents in such a position, this seems like a very appealing way 
of deciding how to act in the face of their normative uncertainty. Second, they may 
wish to avoid moral blameworthiness if their decision turns out to be the wrong one, 
similarly to the way in which we would not attribute rational blameworthiness to an 
agent who was descriptively uncertain. Expected Moral Value Theory, which is the 
subject of much of this thesis, attempts to satisfy both of these aims. It suggests agents 
ought sum over the moral theories in which they place credence, accounting for the 
relative goodness or badness of each act and outcome according to each moral theory, 
and the probability of that act or outcome arising, as well as the degree of credence 
that they have in that theory. In doing so, it can provide agents with a type of 
guidance that satisfies their intuitions about what they should do in these situations, 
and may also avoid the blameworthiness that would otherwise be attributed to their 
actions. 
 
This thesis will comprise a brief survey of the current literature on decision-
making under conditions of normative uncertainty. It will first, outline the standard 
expected moral value approach to such quandaries. Second, it will explain why all 
variants of this theory face difficulty in overcoming the problem of intertheoretic 
value comparisons. Third, it will respond to approaches that take the problem of 
intertheoretic value comparisons very seriously, and that argue against the project of 
even trying to develop a decision theory for normatively uncertain agents. Fourth, it 
will argue that the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons admits of an analogy 
to vagueness, such that solutions to the problem of vagueness may help in resolving 
the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons. Finally, taking an epistemicist 
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approach to vagueness, it will propose and defend a decision theory for agents who 
are normatively uncertain. 
 
Section 2 Expected Moral Value Theory 
 
The typical approach to what an agent should do when they are normatively 
uncertain is to borrow the account of expected utility theory from practical decision 
theory. Put roughly, according to expected utility (EU) theory, an agent should: 
calculate what the utility of a possible outcome is according to their utility function. 
Calculate the probability of that outcome being the outcome that is instantiated. 
Multiply the utility of that outcome by its probability of occurring. Repeat for each 
outcome and then sum up. An agent should then do whichever outcome has the 
highest expected utility. More formally: 
 
𝐸𝑈(𝐴) = ∑ 𝑃𝐴(𝑜)𝑈(𝑜)
𝑜∈𝑂
 
 
Where A is some action; O is the set of possible outcomes; PA(o) is the probability of 
outcome o, given A; and U(o) is the utility of o. 
 
The process for agents operating under normative uncertainty is similar (see, 
e.g. Sepielli, 2009). Put roughly, according to expected moral value theory 
(henceforth, EMV and EMVT), an agent should: calculate the expected value of their 
action according to some moral theory that they lend some credence. Multiply that by 
their percentage certainty that that theory is the correct theory. Repeat for each moral 
theory under consideration, and then sum up. More formally: 
 
𝐸𝑀𝑉(𝐴) = ∑ [𝑃(𝑇ℎ) [∑ 𝑃𝐴(𝑜)𝑈ℎ(𝑜)
𝑜∈𝑂
]]
ℎ∈𝐻
 
 
Where H is the set of moral theories to which the agent lends credence, and h is a 
member of that set; P(Th) is the probability that the agent attributes to the likelihood 
of h being the correct moral theory; and Uh(o) is the value of outcome o according to 
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moral theory h. Borrowing from the claim that an agent who deliberates using 
expected utility theory “hedges” their bets, this process is sometimes called “moral 
hedging” (henceforth, MH), and this term will be used interchangeably with EMV 
throughout this thesis. 
 
2.1 Moral Theory and Decision Theory 
 
 In applying EMVT, there is an initial question as to whether all moral theories 
can be represented as value functions and, even if they can, which information should 
be taken into account when constructing those value functions. Initially, the problem 
of constructing value functions will be put aside for the purposes of this thesis. I will 
assume that value functions can be coherently assigned to moral theories. This 
assumption is plausible given that most moral theories contain something like the 
tools to make decisions between competing options that can be counted as good or 
bad.  
 
In standard decision theory, if an agent’s preferences satisfy the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern (1953) axioms, then their preferences are representable as a 
utility function.
1
 There is no reason, in principle, that similar, or at least sufficiently 
analogous, assumptions could not be made of rational agents and the moral theories to 
which they subscribe. Although, for example, some moral theories may not satisfy the 
requirement for transitivity, to the extent that they may regard some acts or outcomes 
as essentially incommensurate, non-transitivity is neither a unique problem for 
representing moral theories as value functions, nor does it count decisively against 
either standard decision theory or the type of value function sought here.
2
 Perhaps 
                                                        
1 Roughly, the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1953) utility theorem states that an agent faced with a 
decision that involves uncertain probabilities will act to maximise expected utility, so long as their 
preferences satisfy the following axioms: completeness, such that for any two options, their preferences 
can be expressed as either M>L, L>M, or M~L, respectively representing a preference for M, L, and 
indifference between the two; transitivity, such that if their preferences are such that M ≥ L and L ≥
N, then M ≥ N; continuity, such that if their preferences are M ≥ L ≥ N, then there exists a probability 
p ∈ [0,1] such that pM + (1 − p)N~L; and the independence of irrelevant alternatives, such that if 
L>M, then for any N and p ∈ [0,1], pL + (1 − p)N > pM + (1 − p)N. 
2 This will be further argued in section 3. Additionally, the tools that have been developed in non-
standard decision theory in response to the problem of parity (see, e.g., Hare, 2010) may also serve to 
resolve this issue. Theories that have absolute prohibitions or requirements may violate continuity in 
cases where an agent is presented with three options all of which are absolutely prohibited, and similar 
moves have been made for agents whose preferences do not satisfy the other axioms, but this is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
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some theories are incapable of being represented as such, but this would simply be a 
limitation on the moral theories that can be incorporated by EMVT, to the extent that 
an agent placed credence in a moral theory of this type, rather than a general objection 
to the process of MH. Finally, some writers (see, e.g. Lockheart, 2000, ch. 5) have 
argued that it is simply irrational to place credence in such theories, given that they 
are either internally contradictory or lack the sufficient tools to be action guiding 
whenever the features that make them impossible to represent as value functions 
interact, to the extent that they generate differing claims and lack the tools to resolve 
those claims without contradiction. If this is true, then the fact that our EMVT would 
not be able to provide guidance to agents who placed credence in those views is no 
objection to the view, given the agents are, themselves, irrational. 
 
There are also a number of moral theories that pose serious problems for the 
attribution of value for any intertheoretic comparison (Hedden, 2016). Consider 
deontological theories that have absolute prohibitions on certain actions. What should 
the value of Uh(o) be in these cases? If it were infinite, or at least sufficiently large, 
then the result of our MH would be to always act accordance with this theory, even if 
our belief that it was true were vanishingly small. If it were some other number, then 
choosing that number will either be arbitrary, fail to give sufficient regard to the 
absoluteness of the prohibition, or presuppose some theory of intertheoretic value 
comparison, which begs the question of what that theory should be. Additionally, 
moral theories that distinguish between merely permissible and morally 
supererogatory acts cause similar problems. The value that we attribute to these acts 
cannot be such the supererogatory act is of equal or lesser value than the permissible 
act, as this would fail to capture the sense in which it is morally laudable. But it 
cannot assign the supererogatory act a greater value than the merely permissible act, 
as this would create a sense in which it was morally required of the agent, when the 
theory had initially framed it as an option, if a morally virtuous one at that. Other 
problems exist for variants of moral nihilism, as it would be similarly unclear what 
values should be attributed to any act or outcome; and most variants of utilitarianism 
encounter similar problems when deciding what the appropriate metric for utility is, 
as well as the very similar problem of interpersonal utility comparisons.  
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Section 3 The Problem of Intertheoretic Value Comparisons 
 
Despite these initial barriers to the process, MH is appealing because it 
appears to be a simple and familiar way of satisfying the intuition that, in the face of 
moral uncertainty, we ought account for the degree of goodness or badness that each 
theory attributes to an action and its possible outcomes, as well as the degree of 
credence that we have in each theory. If, for instance, an action is considered merely 
acceptable or slightly good by one theory, and devastatingly evil by another, and I am 
uncertain as to which of those theories is correct, my decision making process ought 
account for the differences in potential moral harms and benefits that each theory 
accords to my actions. In the same case, if I place very little credence in the latter 
theory, then I should not place much weight on the claim that my action will be 
devastatingly evil. This seems to be an important feature of many people’s moral 
deliberations. Ethical vegans and vegetarians are often uncertain as to the moral status 
of animals, but choose to err on the side of caution to avoid being responsible for 
potential harms, and people who are uncertain as to the moral status of fetuses 
sometimes err on the side of carrying a child to term even where it might be to their 
disadvantage. 
 
Unfortunately, MH faces difficulty with the problem of intertheoretic value 
comparisons. Roughly, the problem is that no moral theory has, on its own terms, a 
conceptual framework for comparing the value or disvalue that it attributes to certain 
actions and outcomes with the value or disvalue assigned to the same actions and 
outcomes by competing moral theories. Moral theories only make value comparisons 
within themselves, and often the degree to which a certain act or outcome is morally 
better or worse than another will differ wildly across theories. If I am unsure whether 
utilitarianism, or some deontological theory is true, they might both be in agreement 
that murder is worse than lying, but might disagree about the extent to which it is 
worse, and they might also be in disagreement as to whether lying is worse than theft, 
as well as to the extent to which it is worse. In the absence of some conceptual 
framework internal to the moral theory that allows for intertheoretic comparisons, it 
seems this difficulty is insurmountable. This section will, first, explain why the 
problem of intertheoretic value comparisons also applies to the process of 
constructing value functions, upon which MH relies. Second, it will examine two 
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attempts to solve the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons as it applies to the 
process of MH. This is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the literature, 
but will instead survey some of the most significant approaches. 
 
3.1 Value Functions and the Problem of Intertheoretic Value Comparisons 
 
Initially, were we to simply choose some function of a set that transformed the 
axioms of moral theories into value functions, it is unclear why we should prefer that 
particular value function compared to any other value function in the set that 
represents the moral theory differently (Hedden, 2016). There is no prima facie reason 
why this moral theory should be represented by one member of that set as opposed to 
any other, which is just a restatement of the problem of intertheoretic value 
comparison among competing value functions, rather than between moral theories.  
 
More formally, the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons also applies to 
the types of information that are included in the value functions that represent moral 
theories. Some candidates are: first, level comparisons, which describe the 
identification of some level that is identified across all functions under consideration. 
These comparisons identify some level of value and compare each function according 
to whether or not that level is met, and are especially important in, for example, 
egalitarian theories that demand any of a sufficient, minimum, or equal standard of 
well-being across populations like many Rawlsian theories. Second, zero 
comparisons, which describe where the zero points of each function should be set and 
are important for utilitarianism, to the extent that transformations by the addition of 
any constant to an agent’s utility function impacts the entire moral value of an act. 
Finally, unit comparisons map the difference between two points on some, given 
function to the difference between the same points on an alternative function. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to venture into this extensive, but ancillary literature. 
For the purposes of EMVT, what matters is the unit comparison across the moral 
theories to which an agent subscribes. Zero point comparisons are not at issue, to the 
extent that regardless of whether utilitarianism is represented as function U or 
function U+20, the rankings of actions according to the theory itself remains the 
same. To take an example: 
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𝐸𝑀𝑉(𝐴) = 𝑃(𝑇1) × 𝑃𝐴(𝑜)𝑈1(𝑜) + 𝑃(𝑇2) × 𝑃𝐴(𝑜)[𝑈2(𝑜) + 20] 
= 𝑃(𝑇1) × 𝑃𝐴(𝑜)𝑈1(𝑜) + 𝑃(𝑇2) × 𝑃𝐴(𝑜)𝑈2(𝑜) + 20(𝑃(𝑇2)(𝑃𝐴(𝑜)) 
 
The addition of a constant to either value function simply increases the overall EMV 
of the outcome, but gives no guidance as to the relative value of either U1(o) or 
U2(o). The question at hand is how each of the points on that curve compare to the 
units attributed by any competing moral theory, and zero point shifts do not affect that 
comparison.  
 
By contrast, changes affecting the unit comparisons are at issue, as the 
multiplication of the value function by any scalar changes the outcome of the EMV 
calculation. To take a simple example:  
 
𝑆𝑈𝑀(𝐴) = 0.5 × 0.5 × 8 + 0.5 × 0.5 × 2 
𝑆𝑈𝑀(𝐵) = 0.5 × 0.5 × 5 + 0.5 × 0.5 × 4 
𝑆𝑈𝑀′(𝐴) = 0.5 × 0.5 × 8 + 0.5 × 0.5 × 2 
𝑆𝑈𝑀′(𝐵) = 0.5 × 0.5 × 5 + 0.5 × 0.5 × (2)4 
 
In the case of SUM and SUM′  an agent has equal credence in utilitarianism and 
Kantianism, and believes both A and B are equally probably outcomes. In SUM, the 
agent should choose action A, as utilitarianism attributes the action a value of 8 and 
Kantianism attributes it a value of 2, which is a greater difference than between the 5 
and 4 that they respectively attribute to action B. In SUM′, the agent should choose 
action B, as the multiplication of the value that Kantianism attributes to action B 
results in the difference between the values attributed by each theory being inverted. 
It is the shift in unit comparisons represented by transformation by the scalar 2 that 
changes that result.  
 
3.2 Previous Proposals to Solve the Problem of Intertheoretic Value Comparisons 
 
Lockhart (2000) proposes a Principle of Equity among Moral Theories, which 
states that, for the purposes of intertheoretic value comparisons, the actions that are 
considered to be morally best by each moral theory should be assigned the same 
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value, the actions that are morally worst by each moral theory should be assigned the 
same value, and some transitive ordering among all other actions should decide the 
assignment of value between those extremes. This is implausible given that there is no 
reason that the extent of the moral goodness or badness of an act would be equivalent 
across moral theories, especially if an act carries substantially more weight on one 
moral theory than another (see, e.g. Ross, 2006; and Sepielli, 2013). For example, 
according to some versions of utilitarianism, there is nothing prima facie wrong with 
killing an individual to create some greater good, but Kantianism would place very 
deep moral importance on the murder of any rational agent. Even though it is 
plausible that killing would be among the worst acts on both accounts, the fact that 
Kantianism has more at stake indicates that the difference in value between the 
various actions would be much larger on a Kantian account. There is also no reason to 
believe that the relative value differences between acts within the ordering established 
by each moral theory would be the same or even similar, so the approach would be 
artificial at best and misrepresent the moral theories over which the agent was 
deliberating at worst.  
 
Lockhart’s theory also entails a number of choice points that result in, at best, 
objectionably arbitrary outcomes or, at worst, deeply unintuitive results (Sepielli, 
2013). First, in order to attribute the best and worst possible actions of each moral 
theory the same value, the proponent of this theory must either create some 
boundaries within which the set of possible actions is bounded, or leave the ranking 
that they construct to represent each theory unbounded. In the former case, there can 
be no independent reason as to why the boundaries should exist where the theorist 
places them, beyond mere stipulation. This, again, collapses into the problem of 
intertheoretic value comparison, as it is impossible to distinguish between competing 
approaches to where the boundaries of each theory ought be. In the latter case, this 
approach runs into the same problems of infinities and absolutism as are discussed 
below, and solutions to those problems will also entail arbitrariness or again collapse 
into the problem of intertheoretic value comparison.  
 
There is also the problem of whether, when considering what matters in 
attributing value to the acts according to each moral theory, the theorist ought 
consider only the actual situation at hand and its bearing on possible acts, or 
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alternatively ought consider all possible situations (Sepielli, 2013). It seems plausible 
that the alternative outcomes of this decision would arrive at different results. If the 
moral theory to which one subscribed involved something like the Categorical 
Imperative that required agents to universalise their actions, then only considering the 
actual situation would place insufficient weight on the value a Kantian theory 
attributed to each action and outcome, and the inverse would be true of theories that 
required sole regard to the actual state of the world. The choice to only consider the 
actual situation or all situations would prejudice the process against theories with this 
type of requirement. In avoiding the problem and choosing to examine all possible 
situations, then the theory once more runs into the problems of unboundedness 
outlined in the previous paragraph, given the size of the set. Again, there appears to 
be no independent reason to choose either solution, and different moral theories will 
likely sway the theorist in different directions with regard to that question depending 
on their requirements, once more collapsing into either arbitrariness or the problem of 
intertheoretic value comparison. 
 
A second view, once defended by Sepielli (2009), is that there is sufficient 
agreement between moral theories such that, upon the selection of at least three 
different actions or outcomes upon which the moral theories that an agent finds 
persuasive agree, then the agent can assume that the value functions that represent 
each moral theory will agree on the value that they attribute to at least those three 
points, allowing for intertheoretic value comparisons once some ratio between those 
initially chosen points is extrapolated across the entire function. For example, take the 
case of an agent who is deciding whether or not to get an abortion, and places 
credence in one theory that is pro-life and another that is pro-choice, and apart from 
that difference agreed that lying is less bad than stealing, which is less bad than 
murder, and each act is attributed the same difference in value according to each 
moral theory. According to this view, the same value can be attributed to each of 
those acts according to each moral theory, and the question of what the value of 
abortion is according to each of them is simply where it fits within that range 
according to each theory. 
 
Initially, it is not clear that such background agreement will exist across the 
moral theories to which the agent assigns credence (Hedden, 2016), as many moral 
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theories differ wildly in the value that they assign to even very similar actions and 
outcomes. For instance, one might be able to attribute similar levels of 
blameworthiness on two different moral theories’ own terms to agents who fail to act 
in accordance with each theory, but blameworthiness might be an inaccurate picture 
of what it means to have failed as a moral agent according to a theory that also values 
an agent’s motivations while doing an act that is blameworthy, judging them more or 
less harshly on account of that (Sepielli, 2010). This process would fail to adequately 
capture the latter account. More worryingly, when value theories agree on more than 
one ratio of value differences, this process will often result in contradictions given 
that the ratios that the functions assign may differ in places that are not the original 
fixed points of comparison (Hedden, 2016). For instance, if the moral theories also 
agree on a different ratio between another three points, then it is unclear how we 
could choose between either this or the first ratio in order to assign values to other 
points on the curve. Any attempt to resolve those contradictions will, again, collapse 
into the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons, given that there could be no 
independent reason to choose one set of ratios over another. 
 
Section 4 Objections to Moral Hedging 
 
One response to the problems with each of the approaches outlined in the 
previous section is to simply say that intertheoretic value comparisons are impossible, 
or that there is such difficulty in working out what such a process would look like that 
the process is doomed. There are also some important senses in which normative 
uncertainty is distinct from practical uncertainty, which have led a number of writers 
to question whether normative uncertainty is actually a coherent state, whether acting 
on the basis of MH, as distinct from acting on the basis of expected utility, is in some 
way morally problematic, and whether the fact that culpability may still be extended 
to agents who are morally ignorant defeats the basic motivation for some account of 
MH. This section will first respond to some in principle objections to the process of 
MH, which argue that there is something fundamentally flawed in the approach. 
Second, it will examine some approaches to MH that claim to avoid the problem of 
intertheoretic value comparisons, concluding that they are also insufficient to provide 
guidance to the normatively uncertain agent. 
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4.1 In Principle Objections to the Process of Moral Hedging 
 
Some writers, following Kant (1998), hold that moral truths are a priori. That 
is, that they are fundamental truths and discovering them is not dependent on 
empirical research, rather that, for writers that believe that they are knowable, they 
can only be arrived at by the application of reason. What is required of an agent, then, 
is more deliberation as to what those truths are, such that simply uncovering those 
truths and removing the uncertainty resolves questions of what an agent ought do 
under normative uncertainty. I have no strong reasons to believe that moral truths are 
not a priori, but also no strong reasons to believe that they are not a posteriori or not 
necessary, in which case they would likely not be knowable a priori. I grant that if 
moral truths are, in fact, a priori there may be no barrier, in principle, to an agent 
discovering a priori moral truths through extensive deliberation. Regardless of their 
status, most of us do not believe that we know what they are, and it is not clear how 
we would go about discovering them or if we would even know if we had. This is 
especially true of decisions that we regularly have to make before we have the 
opportunity to deliberate extensively on the fundamental nature of moral truths.  
 
Additionally, the fact that there may be some objective and discoverable facts 
about what constitutes probability and utility serves as no barrier to the pursuit of 
standard decision theory where an agent might be descriptively uncertain. I see no 
reason why normative uncertainty should not be treated similarly. Perhaps this 
reduces any decision theory that incorporates normative uncertainty to a non-ideal 
decision theory. But it seems unobjectionable for an agent who has not solved the 
questions that have plagued philosophers for millennia to ask for such guidance. 
Depending on the nature of the a priori rational truths, there may be independent 
reasons to pursue such a non-ideal approach. This would be the case if moral truths 
were a priori, but not discoverable simply through the application of reason, because 
nearly all agents would require guidance that could not be simply reduced to the 
advice that they should deliberate further, given that they would be incapable of doing 
so. To draw an analogy, many philosophers of mathematics hold that mathematical 
truths are a priori; it does not follow from this that all mathematical truths are 
deducible from reason alone.  
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We know from Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems that there are inherent 
limitations to any formal system that contains basic arithmetic, given that they contain 
statements that are true, but neither provable nor disprovable within that arithmetic 
system. Obviously, this does not make those truths that are undiscoverable through 
the application of reason alone a posteriori, in the sense that they would be 
empirically discoverable. Rather, just that there are limitations on our rational 
capacities. Moral truths may be similar, and there is good reason to think that similar 
limitations exist on our reasoning capacities, if only because moral systems are 
similarly axiomatic and often rely on processes that draw from arithmetic, and 
because we are yet to discover any such a priori moral truths.  If, however, it is the 
case that the a priori moral truths are rationally knowable, then perhaps the advice 
given by each moral theory at the end of our EMV summations will often be to 
deliberate further. I do not see why, in general, this is an objectionable result, as it 
will often be the case that an agent’s normative uncertainty stems from having 
insufficiently considered the merits of and objections to each of the moral theories to 
which they lend credence. It seems plausible, however, that there are cases where 
additional deliberation will not result in the elimination of all but one theory of 
morality and the agent should have some guidance in those situations, especially 
where circumstances are not permitting of even more rigorous moral deliberation.  
 
Another concern that some writers (see, e.g., Harman, 2011; Weatherson, 
2013) have is that MH involves an objectionable kind of moral fetishism. That is, 
acting for the sake of being moral, rather than acting out of a genuine concern for 
morality. The majority of this concern is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to 
say that there is good reason to think that MH is not necessarily fetishistic (see, e.g., 
Sepielli, 2016) because the morally uncertain agent might well be acting out of a very 
deep regard for certain moral norms, they are just uncertain of them or uncertain how 
best to achieve them. The fact that the agent has imperfect credence in a moral norm 
does not mean, of itself, that they are fetishising morality, rather than acting in 
accordance with that norm when their MH process causes them to act on it. If an 
agent did regard some moral norms as important, this would lead them to attribute 
very high moral value or disvalue to the potential outcomes that concerned the norms 
about which they cared according to whichever theory motivated the norm. In any 
case, this objection presupposes moral concerns about which an agent may be 
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uncertain, and presumably this can be factored into whatever MH process the agent is 
using in a way that avoids the objection, by giving appropriate regard to the moral 
norms in themselves. So long as fetishism is not a necessary part of MH, which we 
have good reason to doubt, and is a much stronger claim than the one made by those 
who have raised this objections, non-fetishistic accounts of MH are not problematic. 
 
Other writers (see, e.g., Harman, 2011) believe that ignorance about moral 
facts does not exculpate an agent from moral blameworthiness. If this were true, then 
the pursuit of a decision theory for situations of moral uncertainty would be fruitless, 
as the agent would be morally culpable even if they acted in accordance with that 
theory whenever that theory led them to hedge their bets in such as way as to act 
against the correct theory. Clearly, this presumes that some kind of theory makes 
moral claims over the agent even when they are uncertain about which theory is 
correct, and many of the earlier responses to writers who believed in a priori moral 
truths also hold some weight here. The least controversial examples of this type of 
blameworthiness are those where someone has intentionally caused significant harm 
of the type that is, to a significant extent, uncontroversially bad or on the basis of a 
moral theory that asks them to do harm, or is flawed in some other way. It is not clear 
that an agent who was genuinely normatively uncertain would attribute much weight 
to these theories, or consider them at all. To the extent that they are equivocating over 
genuinely contestable theories, none of which had been proven or disproven through 
reason or other means, then attributing blameworthiness to them would beg the 
question against whichever theory they acted in accordance with, to the extent that it 
condemns them on the grounds of some other competing theory. If they were deeply 
considering theories that were in some way unsound or morally problematic, and then 
acting on them, they might be blameworthy for other reasons, given that they will 
have been epistemically irresponsible. But it seems that MH does avoid 
blameworthiness for moral ignorance in Harman’s most significant sense. It is also 
not clear that these actors are, in fact, blameworthy and much literature has been 
devoted to the subject, though this lies beyond the scope of this thesis. Additionally, 
the normatively uncertain agent also desires the guidance of a decision theory that 
incorporates their uncertainty, so even if it turns out that they are, in fact, 
blameworthy for the actions that they take according to that decision theory, they may 
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still desire its guidance, and this would be sufficient motivation for pursuing such a 
theory. 
 
Hedden (2016) briefly argues that we can avoid the need for any decision 
theory that deals with normative uncertainty if we resist that the fact of there being 
exculpatory factors that mitigate an individual’s blameworthiness for moral failures 
necessitates a sense of the subjective ought that motivates MH. The example that 
establishes this is that of an individual acting violently as a result of a negligent 
upbringing. The claim is that agents might not be blameworthy to the extent that they 
lack control over their actions, but this does not necessitate the development of some 
separate decision theory for actors in similar circumstances. Even if it were to be 
conceded that there are, in principle, reasons that similar circumstances should not 
give rise to this type of decision theory, the need for some decision theory to guide the 
actor who is not epistemically irresponsible yet still normatively uncertain persists, 
even if it does not approach anything resembling an ideal theory. To draw an analogy: 
under ideal conditions an agent would not be uncertain about the descriptive facts 
about the world that are at issue in decision theory. This does not reduce the 
motivation for developing an adequate account of decision theory that the non-ideal 
agents that all of us are can look to for guidance, and there is no reason that normative 
and descriptive uncertainty would be different in their respective motivations for 
defining non-ideal theories that respond to them.
3
 
 
Some writers are not opposed, in principle, to forms of MH, but believe that 
the process will fail to even get off the ground because intertheoretic value 
comparisons are prima facie impossible (see, e.g. Gustafsson and Torpman, 2014). 
The argument is that comparisons of this type are category mistakes, like a 
comparison between whether the sky is bluer than the sun is hot, and it is just 
unintelligible to ask whether or not an action is better according to one moral theory 
than according to another, given that no moral theory provides a conceptual 
framework for intertheoretic comparisons. There are plausible reasons, in principle, to 
think that intertheoretic value comparisons are not mere category mistakes. First, as 
                                                        
3  Further, for readers that, following Putnam (2002), are persuaded that there is, in fact, no real 
distinction between the normative and the descriptive, rather than just that the non-ideal treatment of 
them should be similar as is argued here, this conclusion will readily follow from that analysis. 
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discussed in section 3, this is a process that we regularly engage in, at least to some 
extent. We seem to have some intuitions about what the appropriate unit comparisons 
are, or just intuitions that they exist. For instance, the degree to which murder is 
worse than insulting someone on a Kantian theory is obviously greater than the 
difference between the goodness of one and two lollipops on a utilitarian theory. It 
seems plausible that there would in fact be unit comparisons that those intuitions are 
mapping, if imprecisely, or the type of intuitions that we have about comparisons 
between moral theories at their relative extremes would be extremely difficult to 
explain. If there is, in fact, no way to make unit comparisons between each function, 
then opponents of this view need to explain away those intuitions. It is unclear what 
that explanation could be, given that our moral theories are largely codifications of 
various intuitions, so it would be difficult to explain what it is about moral theories 
themselves that make our intuitions misguided or inappropriate in the relevant sense. 
 
Second, our moral theories result from a largely shared set of moral intuitions. 
Obviously, each deals with those intuitions in often profoundly different ways, but 
they all share the common feature of applying reason to our intuitions and formalising 
a moral system around them.
4
 Although each moral theory accepts a different set of 
initial axioms, the way that those axioms are arrived at is generally just an expression 
of what we feel is morally good or bad. Many of our intuitions stem from sociological 
processes that we internalise as we develop, and given that most human beings go 
through very similar socialization processes, it seems plausible that there would be a 
deep connection between both the content of our intuitions and the way that they are 
realised in moral theories. If both our intuitions and similar reasoning processes 
obtain across the entire set of moral theories, or at least those in which an agent might 
legitimately have a degree of credence, it seems plausible that there will be some fact 
that allows us to make comparisons of value across the various theories. 
 
Third, and relatedly, moral theories tend to share the same motivations. They 
attempt to capture something about our moral experiences and give us guidance 
                                                        
4 This follows a similar approach to the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons (Ramsey, 1931), 
which argues that facts of shared biological responses mean that it is possible to make comparisons 
across the utility functions of individuals. Obviously, the extent to which there is shared biology and 
shared intuitions and motivations for moral theories make for somewhat of a disanalogy, but the 
argument is framed here on its own grounds, and not in terms of any analogy. 
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whenever we face issues of moral importance. The types of actions and outcomes 
with which they deal are all part of the same set of actions and outcomes that human 
beings encounter because there is only a limited set of moral dilemmas that human 
being are likely to engage in. Given that shared motivation and the fact that they deal 
with similar sets, it seems likely that there would be some way of comparing different 
responses to members of that set. It would be a strange result indeed if the value that 
our moral theories applied to members of the same set were so fundamentally 
different as to be completely incomparable. 
 
Fourth, we engage in direct comparison between moral theories in ways that 
are distinct from just the value that they attribute to things. For example, many people 
are persuaded by non-consequentialist objections to utilitarianism that argue, roughly, 
that utilitarianism fails to give the appropriate regard to morally significant beings, 
reducing them to mere calculators of utility and disutility in a way that is morally 
objectionable. Obviously, the process is not perfectly analogous to intertheoretic 
value comparisons, but utilitarianism has no internal conceptual framework by which 
to process that objection, yet even people who have been utilitarians feel the force of 
the objection, and are often forced to revise their views in response to it. One reading 
of this process is essentially as a value comparison between two moral theories. 
Kantianism, roughly, holds that using a rational agent as a mere means rather than as 
an end in themselves is unacceptable due to the fundamental recognition that they are 
owed just in virtue of being a rational agent. Utilitarianism has no such qualms, and 
using a rational agent as a means would be acceptable provided it were utility 
maximising. But somehow we still feel the force of the claim that utilitarianism is 
inappropriately valuing rational agents, even though utilitarianism in itself does not 
feature the valuation of any such claim, even if we otherwise find utilitarianism 
compelling.  
 
It is difficult to see what the force of the Kantian objection to utilitarianism is 
if it is the case that comparisons of value between different moral theories is actually 
impossible, and opponents of this view would need to explain, without reference to 
the values that the Kantian claim is expressing, what we are doing when we engage in 
this type of evaluation. One answer might be that we do not interpret such objections 
on the grounds of the theory that we are defending against it. Rather, the force of 
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these objections is that they speak to some external set of intuitions that then cause us 
to revise our credence in the theory. The intuitions that we have, however, are at least 
somewhat responsive to the theory that we hold. This is especially true of people who 
were raised with a belief in a moral theory, but also true of people who make 
commitments to a moral theory and hold those commitments for some time, and use 
them to guide their actions. For these people, who hear an objection that causes them 
to reconsider their commitments to a moral theory, it seems implausible that the 
objection appeals to external intuitions. At the very least, those external intuitions 
would have to be weighed against intuitions that have been learned or honed by a 
commitment to the theory. Even in these cases, however, the objection still has force 
and may lead the defender of the moral theory to revise their commitment to it. 
Another possible reading is that the Kantian is, in fact, making an intratheoretic claim 
on the grounds that the utilitarian is just undervaluing human life and agency. This 
also misplaces the force of the objection. Even if the utilitarian were to increase the 
numerical value that they applied in these situations, it is not clear that those who find 
the objection persuasive will be satisfied. To at least some, any number would still 
seem to insufficiently value human lives, per the Kantian objection, so they would 
still be motivated to either revise their theory or their credence in it. 
 
A more plausible reading of the function of these objections is as a direct 
comparison between competing value sets, with the agent eventually finding one set 
of values to be more persuasive than the other. If this process is better understood as 
an appeal to a separate set of intuitions, then that lends further support to the 
possibility of intertheoretic value comparisons. The process that we would engage in 
would be that which is described in the first of these responses as to why the problem 
of intertheoretic value comparisons might have a clear solution. More importantly, 
this comparison of competing intuitions would likely happen closer to what might be 
the borderline cases in a ranking of moral actions or outcomes. It is not obvious to the 
agent that their moral theory was clearly flawed in some way until they consider the 
force of the objection, and elect to resolve the quandary in one way or another. 
Obviously, this would not be a paradigm borderline case, but the fact that different 
agents respond to the same objections differently and the fact that this constitutes a 
genuine moral difficulty for most agents indicates that, if this process is something 
like the process of making intertheoretic comparisons of value, there are grounds for 
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thinking that such comparisons are possible even in situations that are more morally 
murky.  
 
Fifth, and relatedly, we regularly adapt our moral theories by taking from 
competing moral theories even where they differ wildly in the value that they attribute 
to various actions or outcomes. Many consequentialists implement strict side 
constraints taken from deontological theories in order to deflect the force of the above 
objection to utilitarianism.
5
 When they do this, it is either the case that the values that 
those side constraints have are translated into the consequentialist theory when they 
are incorporated into it, vindicating intertheoretic value comparisons, or it is the case 
that side constraints adapted from other moral theories are doing something very 
strange when they operate. If the values that those side constraints express cannot be 
compared across moral theories, then it is deeply unclear whether or not and how they 
operate to make legitimate moral claims of agents who subscribe to the theories that 
they have been incorporated into, and opponents of this view would need to give 
some account of this. If our moral theories are capable of being adapted in response to 
other moral theories, then value comparisons seem somewhat plausible. 
 
The final concern that I will mention briefly in this sub-section is that an agent 
may also be uncertain as to which theory of calculating EMV is correct, which leads 
to some kind of regress, making decision making on this basis impossible (Sepielli, 
2010). First, this is at least as true of the theories of probability and utility on which 
expected utility theory is based. Second, it is not clear that this regress is especially 
problematic. It seems plausible due to the objections raised above, as well as the 
apparently intractable nature of the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons, that 
there are a relatively finite number of ways of making intertheoretic value 
comparisons such that the regress is unlikely to be infinite. Resolving this worry 
would simply require summing over your credence in each of the theories of EMV in 
the same way that the EMVT requires you to sum over your credence in a variety of 
                                                        
5 There is some debate over whether or not theories that import side constraints of this type are, in fact, 
consequentialist. Readers who are not persuaded that they remain so should simply read these 
arguments as appealing to the way in which those new moral theories, whatever one prefers to call 
them, incorporate the values of a variety of different moral theories and seem to be able to compare 
each of those values to one another, even though they originate from other moral theories. 
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different moral theories. Finally, the arguments in sections 6 and 7 of this thesis are 
not subject to this objection, so further discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
In summary, the value that moral theories attribute to actions and outcomes 
seem like the type of things that would be essentially comparable, or something very 
strange happens when we make a variety of what seem like commonplace moral 
claims and decisions. Therefore, it seems likely that there is an answer to how unit 
comparisons should be done, and our confusion as to how that might be says nothing 
about the nature or possibility of intertheoretic value comparisons, but rather our 
ignorance. I have no strong reasons for or against the proposition that the appropriate 
fixing of unit comparisons is something that is, in principle, knowable after further 
deliberation, but I do think that, once we have appropriately diagnosed the problem of 
intertheoretic value comparisons as one of vagueness, as will be seen in the next 
section, then it is quite plausible that there is, in fact, such a method of comparison. 
 
4.2 Moral Hedging without Intertheoretic Value Comparisons 
 
There are some theories that concede that the problem of intertheoretic value 
comparisons is insurmountable, but attempt to construct an approach to MH that 
avoids it, and these will be examined in this sub-section. One possible approach might 
be, roughly, that when an agent is normatively uncertain, they are morally required to 
take actions over which there is agreement according to all moral theories under 
contention, otherwise all actions in which at least one moral theory lends support are 
permissible. Obviously, this leads to some deeply unintuitive results. If an agent only 
has a very small degree of credence in some moral theory, actions that are supported 
by that moral theory and condemned by all other theories in which the agent places 
credence are permissible. This would be a very strange result, especially if, for 
instance, the moral theory that supported the action only assigned it a very small 
positive value, and all other theories assigned it extremely high disvalue.  
 
Additionally, this would lead to the agent regularly acting inconsistently. This 
result is objectionable because morally inconsistent agents will be plagued by the 
moral analogues of money pumps. That is, if they are presented with a series of 
choices, the theory permits agents to make a series of actions that, while individually 
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permissible, will result in certain moral loss according to each of the theories in which 
they place credence. For example, an agent may purchase a battery hen farm. Each 
day they have the choice to either continue to use the hens for egg production, causing 
the hens pain and distress but being able to feed themselves and their family, or to let 
some of the hens go free. When they act inconsistently, on one day they make a 
certain moral loss in terms of feeding their family, and on the next they make a certain 
moral loss in terms of causing the hens harm. But the process continues because 
neither theory regards that which the other considers a loss as a loss on its own terms. 
It may also be the case that such agents remain morally culpable for harms that they 
cause in accordance with this approach, especially if moral inconsistency is 
something to be avoided in itself or the theory that is, in fact, true is not the one that 
they chose to act in accordance with. 
 
An approach that, initially, seems promising in avoiding such inconsistency is 
My Favourite Theory as defended by Gustafsson and Torpman (2014). Roughly, this 
theory says that a normatively uncertain agent should simply act in accordance with 
the theory in which they place the highest credence, and its primary virtue is that it 
allows agents to act consistently in the face of normative uncertainty. One objection 
to this theory is that it provides no guidance to agents who place equally high 
credence in more than one moral theory; such agents would be subject to similar 
moral money pumps. Gustafsson and Torpman’s response is to adapt their theory such 
that it does not permit an agent to take an action that would violate the moral theory 
that they most recently followed, avoiding the problem. This is an unsatisfactory 
solution. First, the prescriptions of the theory that they now intend to act in 
accordance with may place enormous disvalue on the action that they would have 
taken in accordance with the previous theory, which only places a very small value on 
that particular action. In these cases, electing to act consistently may fail to give the 
appropriate regard to the fact that one moral theory has much more at stake than the 
other, which was an important motivation for EMVT. Although Gustafsson and 
Torpman reject that there is a way of making coherent intertheoretic value 
comparisons, the theory fails to capture our intuitions about what a normatively 
uncertain agent should do.  
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Second, if the reason that an agent intends to violate the moral theory that they 
last acted in accordance with is because their degree of credence in that particular 
theory has changed substantially, this theory leads to unintuitive results and make the 
agent subjectively morally culpable because they elected to act consistently, rather 
than in the way that is morally right. It might be replied that the consistency 
constraints only apply when agents have not changed their credences about the moral 
theories about which they are uncertain. This still causes the view some problems. 
Initially, even if an agent’s credences have not changed, a moral theory in which they 
place equal credence to the one that they would be violating if acted on it may 
respond better to the situation at hand. They might, for example, have previously 
acted on some utilitarian theory, which gives little regard to the loss of individual 
lives so long as it is utility maximising, but are now presented with a situation where 
it seems most correct to not use a person as a means, per Kantianism. This theory is 
therefore still unresponsive to our intuitions that, when we are normatively uncertain, 
our decisions should also be sensitive to the relative weight that each theory attributes 
to each act and outcome. Second, it is not clear that this theory can make any claim to 
be giving guidance to a normatively uncertain agent, given that the value that an agent 
is tracking is consistency, rather than what is morally correct. As a result of this 
move, this theory is not tracking what is subjectively morally right in the cases of 
individual decisions, but rather just stipulates that consistency is what the agent 
should follow in these cases, rather than having any particular regard to morality qua 
morality. It is unclear why consistency is, of itself, a virtue with which morally 
uncertain agents should concern themselves.  
 
Third, it is not evident that the view does, in fact, avoid the problem of 
intertheoretic value comparisons. For example, an agent might also be normatively 
uncertain about the status of My Favourite Theory as the appropriate approach to MH. 
At which point, the theory is, itself, subject to a higher order normative uncertainty 
that seems unresolvable if the alternative theory in which the agent places the highest 
overall credence places limited or no value on being morally consistent and there are 
other strong reasons, as above, to act inconsistently in response to a particular moral 
dilemma. The only way that the proponent of this theory can resolve this is to require 
that their theory also apply at every level of higher order normative uncertainty, but 
this would simply beg the question against other approaches to MH if an agent placed 
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equal credence in other theories, and be self-defeating if an agent placed higher 
credence in an alternative approach. 
 
Section 5 Normative Uncertainty as Vagueness 
 
Much of the language that we use to make both practical and moral decisions, 
as well as to describe the world is vague. Most predicates are incapable of being 
sufficiently defined such that they avoid this, and often resist attempts at sharpening. 
This section will first, establish an account of the conditions for predicate vagueness. 
Second, it will argue that the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons, as well as a 
number of other similar philosophical quandaries, is best understood as problems of 
vagueness, or at least will admit of similar solutions. Finally, it will analyse some 
objections to characterising the problem in this way. 
 
5.1 Vagueness and Indeterminacy 
 
In general, a predicate is vague when its basic conceptual role can generate 
partial beliefs that we believe cannot be improved by further investigation (Horwich, 
2000). A partial belief is to be distinguished from a complete belief in the sense that 
we can have full credence in the latter, but we attribute at least some degree of 
uncertainty to the former. We are able to form complete beliefs about some things, 
even when the predicate is vague when applied to other instances. For instance, under 
ideal epistemic circumstances, we know that the paradigmatic cases of a bald man and 
one with a full head of hair are respectively bald and not bald. But if we were to take 
the man with a full head of hair and pluck each of those hairs individually, at some 
point, although we would not be able to say precisely when, our belief that he was not 
bald would become partial, although we would be very certain that he was not bald. 
As the plucking process continued, our certainty that the man was not bald would 
reduce until we believed equally that the man was bald and not bald, and we would 
become increasingly certain that he was bald as additional hairs were removed. 
 
Many predicates are of this type. Those that are not, longer than 5 metres, for 
instance, are sufficiently well defined such that there are no borderline cases between 
the different objects to which the predicates are applied and are not our concern here. 
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Vague predicates may be clearly applied at the extremes of the set of objects to which 
that predicate and its negation applies, but there is typically a set of borderline cases 
between those extremes where the question of whether or not the predicate applies to 
an object or not becomes increasingly vague. Some objects may be genuinely 
borderline cases between the predicate and its negation, such that whether or not the 
predicate can be applied to the object is genuinely indeterminate. Roughly, a predicate 
is vague when:  
 
its meaning can be confidently applied to objects possessing a value of some 
fundamental parameter that is greater than x; its negation can be confidently 
applied to objects possessing a value of some fundamental parameter that is 
less than y; and neither can be confidently applied to objects possessing a 
value of some fundamental parameter that is between x and y, where x is 
greater than y (Horwich, 2000). 
 
There is some discussion in the literature about what precisely the definition 
of vagueness should be, but that discussion has tended to focus on making the 
definition more expansive so as to not rule out some competing theories of vagueness 
from the start. One approach is just that the predicate has borderline cases (Bueno and 
Colyvan, 2012). Another is just that the predicate generates sorites paradoxes (Bueno 
and Colyvan, 2012), which are arguments of the form:  
 
1.  𝐹𝑎1 
2.  𝐹𝑎1 → 𝐹𝑎2 
3.  𝐹𝑎2 → 𝐹𝑎3 
… 
4.  𝐹𝑎𝑖−1 → 𝐹𝑎𝑖 
5. ∴  𝐹𝑎𝑖 
 
Where F is some predicate that generates sorites paradoxes, and 𝑎𝑖 is some object in 
the series with regard to which F generates sorites paradoxes. The argument is 
paradoxical given that 𝐹𝑎𝑖 may be an absurd conclusion, although the argument as a 
whole seems both valid and sound. It is sufficient for our purposes to use a more 
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restrictive definition, as if any of the subsequent sections of this thesis are persuasive, 
a more accommodating definition would simply have made that easier. 
 
In building towards an understanding of the problem of intertheoretic value 
comparisons as at least analogous to vagueness, a starting point is noting that non-
moral value comparisons also suffer from a degree of vagueness. If my house were 
burning down and the firefighters assured me that they only had time to save either 
my briefcase full of cash or some childhood photo album of enormous emotional 
value, it would be difficult for me to make a decision. On the face of it, the value of 
these items is incommensurable. Slightly increasing or decreasing the value of one or 
the other by adding $100 to it doesn’t solve my dilemma, because they both mean a 
great deal to me and this is unlikely to be enough to sway my decision either way. If, 
however the value of either were to change substantially, my decision would be easy. 
If a neighbour informed me that most of the money in the briefcase had been stolen 
last night, or if the sentimental thief had instead stolen most of the photos in the 
album, I could choose the item that remained intact without regret. At the two 
extremes of the possible value I could attribute to each item, my choice is very clear, 
and I am able to readily prefer one to the other, although the things that are being 
valued are incommensurate. My preferring the intact briefcase to the mostly empty 
photo album is not an indication that I am able to place a monetary value on my 
sentiments. Rather, it is an indication that there are at least some cases where practical 
comparisons between different types of value are possible. 
 
A clearer picture emerges when we formalise the comparison. If I am deciding 
whether or not to save my money, given that some of the photos from my album have 
been stolen, although I am unsure how many, I might construct some transitive 
ranking of the possible states of my photo album. The worst possible outcome would 
be if all of the photos had been stolen, the next worst would be that one or two had 
been left but they were not particularly important to me, and so on until the photo 
album was complete. My neighbor has also informed me that the alleged thief looked 
a lot like one of my close childhood friends who had promised to return to me a 
number of other photos of sentimental value and it occurs to me that what my 
neighbor believes was a theft may have been the addition of new photos, for whatever 
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reason. So I am able to add additional improved states of the photo album to my 
ranking until I reach the best possible state the photo album could be in. 
 
At the top of the chain, the value of the money in the brief case pales in 
comparison to the emotional value of the photo album. At the bottom of the chain, the 
opposite is true. At some distance from the bottom of the chain and some distance 
from the top of the chain there is a zone where my choice becomes much less clear, 
although I still believe to some extent that the money is worth more than the photo 
album at the bottom of the chain, and the inverse at the top, in precisely the same way 
as a single predicate that was somewhat vague picked out objects to which it might 
apply (Broome, 1999).  
 
It should be noted that some writers distinguish vagueness from 
incommensurability. The orthodox view of incommensurability is trichotomous 
incomparability (Elson, 2017). Where trichotomous incomparability is defined as: 
 
x and y, which are appropriately compared with respect to some value, P, are 
trichotomously incomparable when it is false that x is Per than y, and that y is 
Per than x, and false that x and y are equally P.  
 
To motivate the view that incommensurability may be a form of vagueness, it must be 
shown that the concept of vagueness can explain trichotomous incomparability.
6
 In 
doing so, it is important to distinguish between two different types of borderline case 
(Elson, 2017): in cases where we are simply trying to discover whether an object has 
some feature, we are attempting to discover whether it belongs in the category 
described by the predicate, and it is relatively uncontroversial that such predicates are 
                                                        
6  Broome has famously argued that incommensurability is vagueness by appeal to the collapsing 
principle: For any x and y, if it is false that y is Fer than x and not false that x is Fer than y, then it is 
true that x is Fer than y (Broome, 1997, p. 74). One implication of the collapsing principle is that 
unidirectional incommensurability, where, for instance, x is incommensurable to y, but y is better than 
or equal to x, is impossible. Broome’s approach has not been pursued here because this approach is 
vulnerable to a number of quite plausible counter examples that demonstrate the possibility of 
unidirectional incommensurability (see, e.g., Carlson, 2004). For instance, cases where two objects are 
precisely equal with regard to all characteristics that we are certain count towards being candidates for 
some predicate, P, but one object is better with regard to some characteristic that may plausibly count 
towards P but about which we are uncertain. These cases seem like plausible instances of unidirectional 
incommensurability, and it is sufficient for the purposes of this thesis to demonstrate that vagueness 
can describe incommensurability, making an extended defence of Broome’s view unnecessary. 
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cases of vagueness; but this is distinct from the type of comparative 
incommensurability that arises when we are trying to discover which of two objects, 
neither of which are paradigm cases of a predicate, P, or its negation, is more P than 
the other. The relevant question for the purposes of this thesis is whether the latter 
type of case admits of an analogy to vagueness, or will have similar solutions.  
 
First, note that many instances of comparative incommensurability are multi-
dimensional; when we are attempting to decide whether x is balder than y, we must 
take into account not only the number of hairs on each of their heads, but also the 
hairs’ distribution, relative thickness, and locations. Predicates of this type generate 
vagueness because it is unclear which dimensions are decisive, and to what degree, in 
determining whether or not x is Per than y. It is unclear, for instance, how much we 
must thicken x’s hair in order to make him as bald as y, who has fewer individual 
hairs but of much greater thickness. Second, comparative incommensurability may 
derive from vagueness about categories in cases where the application of a 
comparative predicate depends on the application of a categorically vague predicate. 
For instance, if we are trying to determine whether or not Australia or New Zealand 
had more bald men, then what we have to say about the category vagueness, as 
derived from category incommensurability on the view that incommensurability is 
vagueness, of the non-comparative predicate “bald” will determine our answer once 
we consider how we are to count borderline cases of baldness in our comparison. On 
the view that incommensurability is, or is sufficiently analogous to, vagueness, then, 
for two objects to be incommensurate with regard to P is for them to be borderline 
cases that involve comparison in either of the senses outlined above (Elson, 2017). 
Such cases satisfy the conditions for trichotomous incomparability, and the concept of 
vagueness can accurately describe those cases in the way that has been outlined in this 
paragraph. 
 
 Incommensurability can be explained in other ways, by denying that 
vagueness is the appropriate description of them, or by holding that vagueness and 
incommensurability are genuinely distinct categories, and there has been much 
literature devoted to this subject. It is, however, sufficient for the purposes of this 
thesis that incommensurability admits of an analogy to vagueness, or has a similar 
solution. This is because it would just be the case that the problem of intertheoretic 
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value comparisons is one of incommensurability, rather than one of vagueness, as is 
proposed in this thesis. If one remains unconvinced that incommensurability can be 
explained by the concept of vagueness, then the arguments that follow this section can 
be adjusted without significant changes in one of two ways: either, by reframing the 
comparative predicates involved in intertheoretic value comparisons exclusively in 
terms of category vagueness; or by reframing the problem of intertheoretic value 
comparisons as one of incommensurability. In the former case, the arguments about 
solutions to problems of vagueness follow naturally. In the latter case, one would 
simply need to substitute their favoured solution to decisions involving 
incommensurate values in place of the solutions to the problem of vagueness, and the 
approach taken in section 7 could be simply adapted to incorporate the solution to 
incommensurability rather than the solution to the problem of vagueness. 
 
 There is a final concern that the concept of vagueness is only appropriately 
applied to language (see, e.g. Raz, 1986), rather than concepts like moral theories. 
The argument is that, were we to construct a perfectly precise language, then systems 
like moral theories would not exhibit vagueness at all, it is only the language that we 
use to describe them that appears to generate vagueness within the theory. Whether or 
not this is true lies beyond the scope of this thesis for two reasons. First, even if this 
argument is true, most moral theories, and especially the process of comparisons 
between moral theories, would maintain elements of multidimensional comparisons, 
and it is not clear that the concept of vagueness is generated by language itself, rather 
than the process of multidimensional comparisons. The process by which we would 
make intertheoretic value comparisons necessarily comprises features that exhibit 
something that, at least, seems very closely related to the concept of vagueness. It is 
unclear which values should count when we make such comparisons, and to what 
degree they should be weighted against one another when we are determining which 
action we should take, and according to which moral theory. Even if the concept of 
vagueness cannot be appropriately applied to non-linguistic concepts or systems, the 
fact of their apparent closeness would be sufficient to motivate a pursuit along these 
lines. Second, this is at best an argument that the pursuit of an adequate theory of MH 
is non-ideal. Given that we are limited by the constraints of our languages when we 
describe our moral theories and make decisions about them, it seems fair for the 
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normatively uncertain agent to request guidance in the absence of a perfectly precise 
language. 
 
5.2 The Problem of Intertheoretic Value Comparisons and Vagueness 
 
Initially, problems of intertheoretic value comparison seem much like 
problems of vagueness. If I were deciding whether or not to steal a loaf of bread the 
two theories in which I lend credence were some form of utilitarianism and some 
strict deontological theory that prohibited or allowed various actions, I could start by 
constructing a ranking of prohibitions according to the deontological theory.  It might 
place saying something mean to someone as one of the least bad actions I could take, 
then lying, stealing, and so forth. After calculating that my stealing of the loaf of 
bread was acceptable according to my utilitarian theory because the choice was utility 
maximising, I can compare that outcome, at least superficially, to various parts of the 
ranking of actions according to that deontological theory. The best possible acts at 
one end of the chain vastly outweigh my choice, as do the worst possible acts at the 
other end of the spectrum. It is only towards the middle of that chain that my belief 
that stealing the bread according to my utilitarian theory is morally better or worse 
than the actions as ranked by the deontological theory become partial, following the 
same pattern as the vagueness that obtains amongst vague predicates or comparisons 
between items or actions of incommensurate value. 
 
It is useful to clarify what precisely is vague about intertheoretic value 
comparisons. One candidate is the complex relational predicate “morally better than”.  
When applied to intertheoretic comparisons, this takes the more complex form “the 
difference in value between A and B, according to theory x, is greater than the 
difference in value between C and D, according to theory y”. What process is an agent 
undertaking when they attribute this relation to a set of actions? First, they are making 
some claim about how precisely the unit comparisons of the various functions that 
model moral theories x and y should be aligned such that the comparison is possible. 
Second, they are reading off the results of those functions once a unit comparison 
method has been established. Obviously, they are not explicitly committing 
themselves to some fact about what the unit comparisons should be, as they are 
merely speaking from intuition, but in order to make sense of the claim, something 
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like that process must be undergone. The second step is no candidate for vagueness, 
as once the agent has established clear functions for both moral theories, they simply 
read off the result. Which leaves the first step as what creates the vagueness in this 
predicate. 
 
This does not seem, intuitively, implausible. We do not know precisely how to 
fix the unit comparisons of the function once the comparisons between various 
actions according to each moral theory become murky, leading only to partial beliefs. 
We do, however, have quite strong feelings that indicate where they would be fixed 
when we compare acts that are just obviously better or worse than one another at 
either end of the spectrum by which each moral theory ranks acts. This analysis also 
applies to the well-known problem of interpersonal utility comparison.  It is similarly 
obvious to us that torture is much worse than consuming a pleasant beverage, but 
when the comparisons are towards the centre of possible actions or outcomes that bear 
utility or disutility the comparisons become much more murky, and our intuitions 
begin to fail us. In both cases, this is what leads many philosophers to simply claim 
that such comparisons are impossible. But these philosophers would then need to 
explain away our intuitions about the cases that seem so obvious to us, given that such 
comparisons are apparently incoherent or impossible, yet we remain so certain of 
them. The accounts that have been offered in response to both problems fail to do so. 
The fact that such comparisons are difficult, or that we do not yet seem to have some 
function that appropriately makes unit comparisons between the various functions at 
issue without making implausible or objectionable assumptions is no evidence against 
there being some answer to the question. These difficulties are what we should expect 
to find. The sorites paradox has been surprisingly resilient for centuries, and if these 
problems are, as I have argued here, just variants of the sorites paradox, or closely 
analogous to it, we should expect them to be similarly resilient. 
 
Section 6 Solutions to Vagueness 
 
While much of the literature on vagueness has focused on the application of the 
concept to our linguistic practices, it was argued in the previous section that the 
problem of intertheoretic value comparisons is best characterised as a problem of 
vagueness or, at the very least, is sufficiently analogous so as to merit an examination 
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of the various solutions to vagueness of language and how they might be applied to 
the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons. This section will first outline the 
epistemicist view. Second, it will demonstrate that other solutions to the problem of 
vagueness can also provide guidance with regard to the problem of intertheoretic 
value comparisons, if the reader is unpersuaded by epistemicism as a solution to 
vagueness. 
 
6.1 Epistemicism 
 
 Epistemicism is the view that vague terms do, in fact, have sharp boundaries; 
there is a fact of the matter as to whether or not someone is bald, we are just ignorant 
of where precisely that boundary lies, and it is, in principle, unknowable (Williamson, 
2002). Many philosophers have found this unintuitive (see discussion in Horwich, 
2000). Surely, they argue, the fact of such confusion and disagreement about whether 
or not there is such a boundary and, if there were one, where it could possibly lie 
indicates that it is implausible that such a boundary exists. Although this thesis is not 
intended as an extended defence of epistemicism, it is worth examining what 
motivates the view. 
 
The standard approach has been to reject that bivalence obtains for vague 
terms. But, once the existence of such a boundary is rejected, these philosophers are 
faced with a dilemma of classical logic: 
 
(1) ~[𝑇(𝑃) ∨ ~𝑇(𝑃)] 
 
(1) is the denial that proposition P is either true or false, and equivalent to the denial 
of bivalence for that sentence (Williamson, 2002). Tarski’s disquotational schema for 
truth defines what counts as true or false as follows: 
 
(2) 𝑇(𝑃) ↔ 𝑃 
(3) ~𝑇(𝑃) ↔ ~𝑃 
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Given that T(P) is equivalent to P and ~T(P) is equivalent to ~P, this allows for the 
substitution of the terms in (1) to give: 
 
(4) ~[𝑃 ∨ ~𝑃] 
 
Given that: 
 
(5) ~(𝑃 ∨ 𝑄) ⟷ (~𝑃) ∧ (~𝑄) 
 
Proposition (4) collapses into absurdity (Williamson, 2002): 
 
(6) ~𝑃 ∧ ~~𝑃 
 
 In response to this dilemma, there are two options available: to accept that 
there are sharp boundaries to vague terms, or to revise or do away with classical logic 
(Williamson, 2002). In the absence of the latter, it is not implausible that there is, in 
fact, an answer to the question of how the unit comparison of whatever EMVT is 
eventually selected should be set, given that our intuitions seem to suggest that the 
process is possible. Additionally, it is worth noting that the alternative approach, of 
continuing to reject the bivalence of statements like those above, should be especially 
distasteful to most moral philosophers who are not nihilists. We want there to be 
answers to the questions that we have about morality so that our best moral theories 
are able to offer us guidance, which should at least give strong methodological 
reasons in support of following such an approach. 
 
6.2 Other Theories of Vagueness 
 
Epistemicism is an attractive position to the extent that it allows us to keep 
classical logic intact, and there are ways of explaining away our intuitions that it is 
deeply implausible.
7
 Those that reject epistemicism, however, will probably find 
many of the arguments in the previous sub-section to be unpersuasive. Regardless, if 
                                                        
7 As this thesis is not intended as an extended defence of epistemicism, outlining these arguments is 
beyond its scope. Readers who are somewhat persuaded of the epistemicist approach but find it 
intuitively unappealing may find Horwich’s (2000) explanation of those intuitions satisfactory. 
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they accept that the appropriate characterisation of the problem of intertheoretic value 
comparison is one of vagueness, something like MH may still be appropriate on 
competing views of vagueness, and conclusions that are very similar to those drawn 
in this thesis may be drawn. This section will briefly examine two such views. 
 
Those that are willing to reject bivalence despite the inconsistency that this 
creates with classical logic are committed to the view that vague statements are 
neither true nor false. Some versions of this view interpret truth-values as more 
granular, holding a value between 0 and 1 depending on the degree to which the belief 
that is held is partial or not (see, e.g. Smith, 2008). There is no reason, in principle, 
this approach could not be applied to facts about what the appropriate unit 
comparisons of each function should be. One would simply need to attribute a more 
granular truth-value to each candidate fixing of the unit comparisons, at which point a 
variation of the approach outlined in section 7 would also be an acceptable way of 
calculating the EMV of an act. For those views that do not take this approach, and 
instead just deny that vague predicates have any truth value, then the problem of 
intertheoretic value comparisons persists, as this view could not accommodate 
intertheoretic value comparisons of any kind due to the lack of any truth values with 
regard to facts about the comparison process. This position would, however, remain 
unattractive for reasons explored in the previous section. 
 
An alternative theory is supervaluationism (see, e.g. Keefe, 2000). On this 
view, roughly, simple statements about borderline cases of vagueness lack truth 
values, but those statements can be made more precise through acceptable 
sharpenings of those statements. If all acceptable sharpenings of that statement come 
out true, then the statement is “supertrue”, where supertrue just acts as a marker for 
standard truth value, and if the statement comes out false as a result of all acceptable 
sharpenings, then it is “superfalse”. Initially, if some facts about what the unit 
comparisons of each function should be fixed come out true or false on all acceptable 
sharpenings, then this view can accommodate EMVT for those functions, as those 
facts would be identifiable as supertrue or superfalse. Where this is not possible, then 
the view operates very similarly to the simpler claim that it is just impossible to assign 
truth values to borderline cases and the earlier analysis applies. Additionally, there are 
some variants of this view that attribute granular truth-values to borderline cases 
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based on the probability that a randomly selected acceptable sharpening comes out as 
true or false. This variant of the view can make use of the approach outlined in section 
7 with only some minor variations. 
 
Section 7 Making Vague Choices 
 
 This section will propose an adaptation of the standard EMV approach to MH, 
and provide some reasons that such an approach is both justified and adequate to 
provide normatively uncertain agents with the guidance that they need to avoid 
subjective moral culpability. 
 
If we accept that the problem of intertheoretic value comparison is just a 
problem of vagueness, or at least admits of similar solutions, then the project of 
formulating an acceptable method of MH can be salvaged. At each end of the ranking 
of acts according to each moral theory it is intuitively very clear to us what decision 
we should make. It is only as we approach the borderline cases that we start to 
become unsure whether the comparison between the value that each moral theory 
attributes to the various acts and outcomes is even possible. If we are able, with some 
degree of certainty, to identify the range in that ranking over which that uncertainty 
operates, even if we are unsure what the precise facts about where the unit 
comparisons of each function should be are, then this uncertainty can be incorporated 
into our EMVT. Roughly, then, an agent who is normatively uncertain should: given 
some proposal about how to fix the unit comparisons between each value function, 
calculate the expected value of their action according to some moral theory that they 
lend some credence. Multiply that by their percentage certainty that that theory is the 
correct theory. Repeat for each moral theory under consideration, given the same 
proposal about how to fix unit comparisons. Multiply each of those values by the 
probability that the facts about how the unit comparisons should be fixed are the 
correct ones from within the range over which we are uncertain. Repeat for each 
possible way of doing the unit comparisons, and then sum up. More formally: 
 
𝐸𝑀𝑉(𝐴) = ∑ [𝑃(𝐾𝑛) [∑ [𝑃(𝑇ℎ) [∑ 𝑃𝐴(𝑜)
𝑜∈𝑂
× 𝑈ℎ,𝑛(𝑜)]]
ℎ∈𝐻
]]
𝑛∈𝑁
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Where N is the set of possible facts about how the unit comparisons of each function 
should be set, and n is a member of that set; P(Kn) is the probability that n is the 
correct fact about how the unit comparisons should be set; H is the set of moral 
theories to which the agent lends credence, and h is a member of that set; P(Th) is the 
probability that the agent attributes to the likelihood of h being the correct moral 
theory; A is some action; O is the set of possible outcomes, and o is a member of that 
set; PA(o)  is the probability of outcome o, given A; and Uh,n(o)  is the value of 
outcome o according to moral theory h given fact about how the unit comparisons 
should be set n. As discussed in the previous section, those that subscribe to 
alternative views of vagueness can adapt this equation in accordance with their view.  
 
To accommodate the supervaluationist approach: N would be defined as the 
set of appropriate sharpenings; n would be a randomly selected member of that set; 
and P(Kn) would be the probability of unit comparison K being the correct approach 
according to sharpening n. If one believes the granular degrees of truth view, then 
such an approach may look as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑀𝑉(𝐴) = ∑ [𝑇°(𝐾𝑛) [∑ [𝑃(𝑇ℎ) [∑ 𝑃𝐴(𝑜)
𝑜∈𝑂
× 𝑈ℎ,𝑛(𝑜)]]
ℎ∈𝐻
]]
𝑛∈𝑁
 
 
Where: N is the set of possible approaches to unit comparisons; n is a member of that 
set, and T°(Kn) is the degree of truth of that approach to unit comparison. 
 
 There are a number of advantages to this approach. First, if the correct 
characterisation of the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons is one of 
vagueness, then it is the only solution that accurately tracks the dilemma that 
normatively uncertain agents face when they attempt to engage in MH. This, at the 
very least, makes it the best candidate for giving guidance to those agents, given that 
solutions that rely on a mischaracterisation of the problem are much more likely to 
give unsound advice.  
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Second, in the absence of a precise answer to how intertheoretic value 
comparisons should be made, this theory of MH allows normatively uncertain agents 
to make decisions that are relatively likely to be truth-tracking, given that the true 
facts about how the unit comparisons of each function should be set lie somewhere 
within the range of vagueness, and it seems plausible that the false facts about where 
the unit comparisons should be fixed either side of the true facts would cancel each 
other out if we assume that the distribution of those facts would be relatively equal 
either side of wherever the true facts lie.  
 
Third, many writers, as outlined in section 4, believe that agents who act 
inconsistently may either be morally objectionable for acting inconsistently or risking 
making certain moral losses when they have to make a number of moral decisions. All 
other things being equal, this approach provides a consistent tool for making such 
decisions, even though it may not lead to an agent acting consistently in accordance 
with one particular moral theory. This is only an objection to this decision rule if an 
opponent believes that acting inconsistently is, in some way, itself morally 
objectionable. Such opponents are welcome to include their belief that acting 
consistently is important as one of the theories to which they lend credence, and this 
would solve much of the problem if they weighted it appropriately with a high 
credence that this belief is true. It is not, however, the purpose of this decision rule to 
provide advice as to how a normatively uncertain agent might act consistently. 
Rather, it is intended to account for their uncertainty and the relative weights that the 
moral theories about which they are uncertain attach to various actions and outcomes, 
in an attempt to ensure that they are not morally culpable for harms they may cause. It 
is unclear why we should value consistency qua consistency over concerns of 
avoiding culpability for moral harms.  
 
There could be situations where agents who follow this rule may make 
themselves vulnerable to the moral analogue of money pumps, though it is not clear 
that this is the case, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to prove or disprove that 
possibility. The fact that these situations might arise, however, is not sufficient to 
serve as a general objection to this approach. At best, this would call for an additional 
constraint on the decision rule that accounted for decisions that had previously been 
made. Most plausibly, this would be accounted for in the value that each moral theory 
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attributed to each action or outcome. An adjustment of the various value functions 
would be simple if an agent were simply to individuate actions and outcomes 
appropriately, and acknowledge where they are either connected or mutually 
dependent, such that the decision rule would be sensitive to the problems of money 
pumps. Additionally, although it is possible that this decision rule might lead an agent 
to act inconsistently, it is not clear that it does so in the sense that is morally 
objectionable. The inconsistency that most writers take issue with is one where the 
decision rule leads to a series of decisions that result in certain moral loss according to 
each of the theories at issue. In this case, acting in a way that is responsive to the 
different weightings that the moral theories in which an agent places credence 
attribute to various outcomes and actions, in a way that also happens to be morally 
inconsistent, is not vulnerable to that specific objection, as it is not clear that such 
money pumps arise. This decision rule may, in fact, better track the desires and 
intuitions of the normatively uncertain agent, so inconsistency is a cost they may be 
willing to bear. 
 
Fourth, as was noted earlier, this decision rule is readily adjustable given 
uncertainty about appropriate responses to the problems of vagueness and 
incommensurability, to the extent that an opponent wishes to see them as separate, as 
it would only require that the first set of sums be adjusted to accommodate an 
opponent’s favoured solution to those problems. The addition of another set of sums 
could also account for higher order uncertainty about those solutions, and so on. As 
noted earlier, however, it is unlikely that this process would lead to any significant or 
objectionable regress given limitations on the set of plausible candidate solutions to 
those problems. Finally, even if an opponent objects that very process of MH is itself 
ungrounded, at least until we are able to discover clear answers to our most significant 
moral problems, this decision rule can readily occupy the role of non-ideal guidance, 
and significantly reduces the likelihood that an agent is morally culpable for harms 
they may cause in the absence of a clear theory, as was discussed above. 
 
Section 8 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, while the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons does 
present a significant problem for the process of MH, once it is understood as 
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permitting of similar solutions to the problem of vagueness, then it is possible to 
construct a version of EMVT that can give guidance to a normatively uncertain agent 
in situations where the moral theories in which they place credence give contradictory 
advice. This conclusion is important, because most of us are normatively uncertain 
agents, and wish to avoid the potential for moral blameworthiness that arises in 
situations where different moral theories pull us in different directions. It is also 
important because the methodological approach of adapting solutions to the problem 
of vagueness may also apply to other important philosophical questions. 
 
There are a number of problems of comparison that plague a variety of 
different fields, ranging from ethics and decision theory to welfare economics. These 
include: the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, and the problem of 
intertemporal utility comparisons. Initially, it seems these problems may have a 
similar structure to the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons. To take the first, 
it is uncontroversial that an individual experiencing the most intense torture has much 
less utility than someone enjoying an ice cream sundae, and vice versa. It is only 
when the values tend towards the centre of a possible ranking of pleasures according 
to each person’s utility function that our intuitions begin to fail us. Similarly, many 
economists and philosophers would condemn an agent who agreed to some very 
marginal short term pleasure in exchange for a very extreme long term pain as 
irrationally biased towards the short-term. Again, it is only when the value differences 
in the short and long-term become less extreme that we begin to encounter difficulties 
in giving advice to agents making such decisions, or evaluating whether or not their 
decisions could be counted as rational.  
 
 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully analyse each of these separate 
problems. The, at the very least, superficial similarity between each of these problems 
would suggest that a similar approach as is taken in this thesis would also be fruitful 
in examining each of these problems, as each of them show signs of being quite 
closely analogous to the problem of vagueness in ways that this thesis has outlined as 
holding for the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons. Indeed, there may be 
even stronger reasons to believe that, for instance, the problem of interpersonal utility 
comparisons, with the complex predicate “a is better for x than b is for y” or some 
variant thereof, may actually have a very clear set of facts about where the unit 
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comparisons for each individual’s utility functions should be fixed. Beyond sharing 
intuitions, as was the case for intertheoretic comparisons of value, human beings do 
share biological features that would make it quite likely that experiences of pleasure 
and pain would be relatively uniform across human beings. Obviously, there is the 
additional question for the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons as to what 
counts as utility, before they can even begin constructing value functions, but this is 
really just the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons. The approach taken in this 
paper could, given some adjustments in notation, provide a somewhat workable 
answer to both the question of what should count as utility and how to make 
interpersonal utility comparisons, granting some degree of uncertainty. If the 
approach taken in this paper to the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons is 
correct, then it may also have additional, and wide ranging implications for the fields 
that encounter these problems.  
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